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TALKING ONE’S WAY OUT  
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Abstract
The policy of Euro-area officialdom in the period 2010-2011 was to avoid, 
at all costs, a default and restructuring of the sovereign debt of a member 
of the monetary union.  This policy was motivated principally, but not 
exclusively, by a fear that the international capital markets, if forcibly 
reminded of the precarious position of overindebted, growth-challenged 
members of a monetary union, might recoil generally from lending to 
European sovereigns.  In short, they feared contagion.
The only alternative to permitting a debt restructuring, of course, was 
an official sector bailout.  The afflicted countries -- Greece (until 2012), 
Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus -- received loans from official sector sources 
sufficient to allow them to repay in full their maturing bond indebted-
ness.  Whenever and wherever the crisis erupted, contagion was thus held 
in check by the blunt technique of smothering the outbreak -- in money.
The proponents of this policy argued at the time, and argue now, 
that many European sovereigns in 2010 were far too fragile to endure 
a bout of market contagion.  They argued that an acute crisis needed 
to be averted in order to buy time for the implementation of a gradual 
but more durable remedy.  Had the intervening eight years been used to 
reduce the debt vulnerabilities of the peripheral (and even some core) 
states, this argument would now be powerful, indeed invincible.
Unfortunately, the opposite happened.  Average state indebtedness in 
Europe today is about one-third larger than it was in 2008.  Both the 
member states and the market saw the reprieve as spreading a reliable 
official sector safety net under their exposure.  So they kept on borrowing 
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and lending.  Only the zero interest rate policies of the world’s major cen-
tral banks during this period have kept debt servicing costs at tolerable 
levels.
Imagine a treaty creating a monetary union that expressly forbids the 
union from assuming unsustainable debts incurred by member states. 
Imagine further a central bank for the monetary union that is explicitly 
precluded from providing monetary financing directly to member coun-
tries.  If a member becomes financially overextended, how can union offi-
cials jolly the markets into continuing to lend to the country in order to 
stave off a debt crisis?
There are three options:
1. Assure the markets that the weak sister will indeed be bailed out, not-
withstanding the treaty prohibition against doing so.   
2. Artificially maintain the country’s access to private capital markets 
by giving investors a “put” of those debt instruments -- “in unlimited 
quantities” -- to the union’s central bank. 
3. Repeatedly and relentlessly declare, as a matter both of policy and of 
sacred honor, that no default on, or restructuring of, sovereign debt 
within the union will ever be tolerated. 
At the commencement of the Eurozone debt crisis in May of 2010, Euro-
pean officialdom could not embrace option 1 for political and other rea-
sons. 
Even broaching option 2 at that stage would have been hazardous, 
again for political reasons. 
Which left only option 3.
The risks of attempting to talk the Eurozone out of a contagious debt 
crisis (as opposed to restructuring the unsustainable debt loads of the 
affected countries at the outset) were of course visible when the problem 
began in 2010.  The majority of official sector players apparently per-
suaded themselves that this was the least bad alternative at the time.  The 
reprieve purchased by implicitly promising bondholders an official sector 
guarantee of their lending to Eurozone sovereigns, however, now puts 
those official sector actors in a remarkably uncomfortable position.  Any 
suggestion that the implicit guarantee is being withdrawn or even limited 
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could trigger another bout of the financial contagion that the guarantee 
was originally intended to suppress.  The financial firewalls established in 
Europe since the onset of the crisis are manifestly insufficient to contain 
an outbreak of that kind.  In short, the official sector may have grasped 
the wolf by the ears and the tiger by the tail.  They cannot safely back away 
from the implicit promise they have given to private sector creditors but 
they also lack both the financial resources and the political backing to 
honor the promise if called upon to do so in a contagious crisis.  
Limited Choices
When a sovereign debt instrument falls due, the borrower has two, 
but only two, choices -- pay it or don’t pay it.  If the borrower does not 
itself have the financial resources to pay and cannot access commercial 
markets to borrow the funds needed to refinance the maturing debt, 
paying requires the borrower to seek financial assistance from an official 
sector source, multilateral or bilateral.
The “don’t pay” alternative is equally simple.  The sovereign either 
negotiates a restructuring of the debt before the claim falls due (and thus 
avoids an actual payment default) or it fails to pay on the maturity date 
and attempts to negotiate a restructuring afterwards.  Either way, how-
ever, “don’t pay” means “restructure”.
In the case of Greece in the spring of 2010 (and later in Ireland, Por-
tugal and Cyprus), European officialdom could not promise the mar-
kets that the afflicted countries would pay their maturing bonds; this 
would have been tantamount to a pledge to use taxpayer money to bail 
the countries out.  Although such a promise would undoubtedly have 
resulted in continued market access for the afflicted countries, uttering 
it aloud was unthinkable for two reasons.  First, it would have instantly 
been attacked as inconsistent with the no-bailout provision of the treaty 
establishing the monetary union.  Second, official sector assistance for 
the debtor countries was conditioned upon fiscal reform.  Promising the 
markets a bailout -- in effect, committing to bail them out -- would have 
obviously weakened the official sector’s hand in negotiating those fiscal 
reform programs.
Calming the markets through an official sector assurance that the 
debtor countries would pay was thus not feasible.  But if the dichotomy 
boils down to only two choices -- pay or restructure -- the official sector 
could obliquely promise the markets that maturing debts would be paid 
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by vehemently ruling out the option that the debts would ever be restruc-
tured.  Stated differently, if the only options are x or y, you don’t need to 
say “x”, you only need to promise “not y”. 
Abolishing the Death Penalty
This is precisely what some senior European officials attempted to do in 
the early years of the Eurozone debt crisis.  A sovereign debt restructuring 
in the Eurozone, they broadcast, was impossible, unthinkable, illegal, 
immoral and fattening.1  Here are some examples:
 “A debt restructuring . . . would be like the death penalty -- which we 
have abolished in the European Union.”2
 “Restructuring . . . would entail a major economic, social and even 
humanitarian disaster within Europe.”3
 “How can people invest in the euro area . . . if they are told ‘we are not 
sure if you will get your money back’?  What kind of advertisement 
is it for the euro if we tell people ‘you can come and invest but we are 
encouraging restructuring’?4
 “In the worst case, the restructuring of a member state could over-
shadow the effects of the Lehman bankruptcy.”5
 “A debt restructuring in Greece would have major consequences on 
the soundness of the banking sector in Greece as well as on any banks 
having exposure to Greek securities.”6
1 For vivid descriptions of what occurred, see Martin Sandbu, Europe’s Orphan: The 
Future of the Euro and the Politics of Debt (2015); Paul Blustein, Laid Low: The IMF, 
the Eurozone and the First Rescue of Greece, CIGI Working Paper 61 (2015); Landon 
Thomas & Stephen Castle, The Denials That Trapped Greece, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 
2011.
2 Ralph Atkins, Interview Transcript: Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, member of the Executive 
Board of the European Central Bank, Financial Times, May 29, 2011.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Euro Restructuring Could Overshadow Lehman -- ECB’s Stark, Reuters, April 23, 2011 
(quoting ECB Executive Board member Jurgen Stark); see also Blustein, supra note 1 
(reporting on ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet’s fears of a Lehman-like moment in 
Europe should Greece embark on plans to restructure its debt in 2010).
6 Jonathan Stearns, EU’s Rehn Warns of ‘Devastating’ Impact of Greek Restructuring, 
Bloomberg, May 11, 2011 (quoting Olli Rehn, EU Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Commissioner).
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Contagion
These and similar declarations of the impossibility of a sovereign default 
or debt restructuring in the Eurozone had one overriding objective -- 
avoid contagion.
“Contagion” is an interesting word.  Most people immediately asso-
ciate it with a communicable disease.  The common cold is contagious. 
But so, they say, is yawning.  Even a catchy tune can be said to be conta-
gious if you find yourself humming it for the rest of the day.
“Financial contagion”, in the context of a sovereign debt crisis, can 
describe one of two possible phenomena:
Blind contagion occurs when markets, observing fiscal malfeasance 
or simple misfortune in one debtor country, irrationally recoil from 
lending to other sovereigns that are wholly innocent of, or unaffected by, 
the causes of the problem in the trigger country.  Blind contagion thus 
resembles the transmission of a communicable disease.  The victim has 
the bad luck to be in the wrong place at the wrong time when a virus or 
bacterium is abroad.  The sovereign victim of blind financial panic simi-
larly suffers from bad luck; the occasional tendency of markets to become 
skittish and undiscriminating.
Perceptive contagion, however, results from the market’s sudden real-
ization that the causes of the financial distress in the trigger country are 
also present elsewhere in the region or in the asset class generally.  This 
produces a “golly, if it could happen there, it can happen here” revelation. 
Countries affected by this form of contagion are not innocent victims of 
bad luck or bad geography.  They are themselves in some way financially 
vulnerable and thus become predictable casualties whenever investors 
are forcibly reminded of the risks of sovereign fragility.
If blind contagion is best compared to catching a cold on a crowded 
subway, perceptive contagion resembles a midsummer cocktail party 
when a torrential rain storm erupts.  Someone at the party, remembering 
that he left his car window open, bolts outside to effect a remedy.  His 
action reminds the other guests that the front seats of their own auto-
mobiles may similarly be at risk.  The result?  A suddenly empty cocktail 
party.
Politicians usually try to convince us that sovereign financial conta-
gion is of the blind variety while in practice it is normally of the perceptive 
kind.
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Financial Contagion in Europe
The main propellant for the official sector’s response to the Eurozone debt 
crisis was thus a fear of contagion -- more precisely, perceptive contagion 
-- on the part of the markets.  Greece, which had been borrowing not 
too many months before at a spread of only 20bp over German Bunds, 
openly acknowledged its inability to pay its maturing debts out of its 
own resources.  That was a revelatory moment for investors.  Might the 
problems that were laying low the Hellenic Republic -- a huge debt stock, 
anemic growth, chronic public sector deficits, the inability to devalue 
the currency -- similarly affect other Eurozone sovereigns?  Gosh, the 
markets might ask themselves, if it happened in Greece, could it also 
happen in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Belgium or France?
The official sector therefore felt itself confronting a clear and present 
danger of financial contagion across other Eurozone sovereigns.  Not 
a blind contagion, however, in which the markets react irrationally.  A 
spasm of irrationality might have been expected to pass quickly.  In 2010, 
the official sector feared an acutely perceptive contagion once investors 
had been reminded of the limited options facing overindebted coun-
tries that belong to a monetary union.  The only effective antidote to the 
spread of that perceptive contagion, thought some in the official sector, 
was an assurance that Eurozone countries would never be permitted to 
default on or restructure their maturing debts.  The implication -- which 
the market was left to draw for itself -- was that these countries would be 
the inevitable beneficiaries of a bailout if they lost market access.
When a restructuring of Greek debt did occur in early 2012, of course, 
Europe did not collapse.  The death penalty was not reinstated.  Investors 
did not shun other European sovereigns.  There was no Lehman moment. 
Affected holders of Greek Government Bonds grimaced and grumbled 
but then moved on, as some observers had always maintained they 
would.  As for the belief that markets, once bruised, never forgive and 
never forget, Greece itself punctured that theory by issuing new bonds, 
at a coupon of under 5%, less than two years after inflicting a savage debt 
restructuring on its old bondholders. 
To be sure, the “no default; no restructuring” policy avoided 
unpleasant negotiations with the private sector creditors of Greece (until 
2012), Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus.  But the price of this policy was to 
force a substantial migration of the debts onto the shoulders of official 
sector creditors.  What awaits now is an even more unpleasant discussion 
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of whether, when and how those official sector lenders will themselves 
provide the concessions that they generously deflected from private 
sector investors.
The Implications
Establishing firewalls or shock absorbers like the European Stability 
Mechanism (authorized share capital € 700 billion) are undoubtedly 
helpful to quell outbreaks of blind, irrational contagion.  An afflicted 
country can be expected to return to normal funding operations once the 
panic subsides.  Unless vastly expanded in size, however, such firewalls 
are of less utility when the problem is a fear of perceptive contagion.
By its very nature, perceptive contagion results from a sudden recog-
nition by investors that they -- as sensible, risk averse commercial actors 
-- ought not to be lending to a group of sovereign borrowers, at least not 
at the coupon levels those countries have come to expect.  To be effective, 
therefore, a financial firewall against perceptive contagion needs to have 
both the financial resources and the political backing necessary to fund 
the maturing debts of multiple countries for prolonged periods.  The 
ESM, even augmented by IMF resources, lacks the money and the polit-
ical support to attempt that gargantuan task.
The latent policy question is whether the official sector wants to con-
secrate a system by which the market access of a number of European 
countries is premised not on a sober investor assessment of the credit-
worthiness of the individual sovereign borrowers, but rather on the mar-
ket’s assumption about an inevitable official sector bailout should a bout 
of perceptive contagion again break out.  If it does, then the objective of 
European fiscal integration long promoted by some commentators will 
have largely been achieved, indirectly of course.  It strikes us as unlikely, 
however, that this proposition would enjoy the necessary political sup-
port were it to be put directly to the national parliaments.
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